ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Efficient solutions to the problem of routing in BCCP [1] can be challenging under the presence of spiteful nodes that could intentionally break the protocol and/or broadcast ambiguous information. Secure routing protocols usually mandate cryptographic authentication to decrease the autonomy of attackers to violate rules. We are focusing over the problem of secure communication links and routing based protocols. Lots of Route Discovery Protocols (RDP) based on the Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) has been proposed over cloud network for efficient communication. [2] RDP used in Broker cloud communication link needs to follow few defined steps as:
1. A source node (Broker/ Cloud) desiring to find a path to destination (Cloud/ Broker) floods a route request (RREQ) packet.
Each intermediate node updates its ID / IP address information in RREQ and forwards it
to its neighbours. 3. When RREQ packet arrives at the destination node, it sends back a route response (RREP) packet along with the reverse route which is defined in RREP.
4. Secure DSR protocols will make use of cryptographic authentication to facilitate verification and the reliability of the established route.
In most secure Dynamic Source Routing Protocols, intermediate nodes that promote the RREQ cannot identify spiteful alterations to RREQ packets. In some protocols the destination node can detect inconsistencies and drop such requests. In few protocols, only the source node, at the end of the reverse route, may sense irregularities once the RREP reaches the source node. [2] Here, in-between nodes have to be provided new methods to detect inconsistencies in RREQ to avoid upcoming modified RREQs, which will be failed after wasting lots of execution time and network bandwidth, caused for network delay and increase the possibilities of unwanted traffic. In addition, Due to some of the issues that render early detection difficult, we propose an efficient way out, employing only symmetric cryptographic primitives.
Broker -Cloud Communication Paradigm
BCCP is very helpful to understand the backend communication between client, broker, cloud exchange and clouds. It provide the basic idea of communication but it needs to revise in terms of many aspects like authenticity, data security, SLA, cloud exchange responsibilities etc.
This process needs to be described broadly in terms of responsibilities of each entity.
Figure1. Cloud Exchange Scenario
Client:
1. Task specifications should be clearly identified 2. Minimum uses and maximum budget also need to be clearly identified. 3. Client should be capable to take decision fast in terms of selecting options provided by brokers.
Broker:
1. Need to manage two workflows securely; one is between broker and cloud exchange and other with cloud at the time of task processing. 2. Broker should be capable to transmit the data with cryptographic authentication to decrease the autonomy of attackers to violate rules.
5. User will select service, will sign the SLA and request for secure communication link with broker. 6. Broker will accept the request and create secure communication link with service user. 7. User will submit task to broker using that secure communication link. 8. Broker will provide information about the usage cost of processing particular task as final result to the user. 9. User will pay according to usage through secure gateways.
Secure Broker Cloud Communication Paradigm [SBCCP]
First we broadly divide the paradigm into three different link communication scenarios 1. Broker will search for available clouds with free data centers in cloud exchange for processing specific task. 2. Cloud exchange will provide the information of available clouds with their statistics and number of available data centers. 3. Broker will take decision on the behalf of requirements and information provided by cloud exchange. 4. Broker will select proper cloud, will sign the SLA and request for secure communication link with cloud exchange. 5. Cloud exchange will accept the request and create secure communication link with broker. 6. Broker will request for authentication key for that required clouds. 7. Cloud exchange will share the authentication key information through secure communication link. 8. Cloud exchange will close the secure link.
Cloud Exchange -Cloud Coordinator Communication [CECCC]
Cloud Exchange has the information of all connected clouds, their services, available datacenters, SLA terms and conditions, costing statics etc.
1. Cloud Exchange will request to update above mentioned cloud information at unit time interval. 2. Cloud coordinator will updates all information about services. 3. When Broker will request for authentication key, cloud exchange will inform the cloud about the broker and the task which will require the services of that cloud. 4. Cloud Coordinator will confirm the availability and request to sign SLA. 5. After getting signed on SLA by Broker, cloud exchange will provide it to cloud coordinator. 6. Cloud coordinator provides its authenticated digital signature copy in encrypted form to the cloud exchange. 7. Cloud exchange provides the encrypted digital signature of broker for direct communication in between broker and cloud.
Broker -Cloud Coordinator Communication [BCCC]
Broker has encrypted digital signature of cloud which provide the required services.
1. Broker will send the request for service. 2. Cloud coordinator will request for authentication key.
3. Broker will provide encrypted digital signature to the cloud coordinator. 4. Cloud coordinator will decrypt the key and if it will be authenticated then it will request to send the task to process. 5. Broker will send the task encrypted with its digital signature. 6. Cloud coordinator will decrypt the task by using digital signature of broker and send it for processing in datacenter. 7. Cloud coordinator will reply with result in encrypted form and the cost of processing the task.
8. Broker pay for the services using authenticated gateways.
Efficient Two-Hop Authentication with Secure RDN and MultiSource Broadcast Encryption (MSBE)
We are implementing two hop authentications in establishing the secure communication link, which requires nodes to only maintain a consistent one-hop topology. This is made feasible by the use of Multi-Source Broadcast Encryption (MSBE) scheme, in combination with maintenance of a Secure Reliable Delivery Neighborhood (S-RDN) by every intermediate node. [2] To realize S-RDN for every intermediate node, it is to identify nodes within RDN and provide such nodes with a secret Key. If a node A provides a secret key K A to all nodes in its RDN. All transmissions by A could be encrypted with the secret K A to make sure that "neighbors" not in the RDN cannot get access to transmissions from A.
In the MSBE scheme, 
5. Let U represent the set of all nodes that have been provided with encryption and decryption secret keys, and let N A ∈ U be a small subset of "revoked" nodes, which are not provided with the secret keys. 6. Encrypted Broadcast secret key T A with a subset of its encryption secret keys G A ' ∈ G A , can be conveyed to all nodes by node A in its RDN excluding the "revoked" nodes in the set N A . 7. The particular indices of the encryption keys chosen as part of G A ' for this intention are resolute uniquely, which guarantees that: i. Not any of the revoked nodes will have right to use any of the keys in G A ' ii. All other node in U \ N A will have access to at least one of the secret keys in G A ' with a high possibility. To transmit the secret key to nodes in the set U \ N A , node A assembles a broadcast message As the destination node receives the first RREQ, it goes in waiting condition for a unit time. 6. When it collects a number of RREQs, it selects the RREQ with the smallest cost value. 7. Destination sends back a Route Reply Packet (RREP) to the source node via the reverse path defined by selected RREQ. 8. An intermediate node records the previous hops and relays the packet up to source node after receiving RREP. 9. Then source node starts forwarding the task via selected route.
SRDP presumes a suitable KDC System (KDS) for pair wise authentication of intermediate nodes. Every intermediate node maintains a SRDN by providing a group secret key to each node in the RDN. We will represent the one-hop RDN secret keys of a node A offers to all nodes in the set n A (the RDN of A) by K A , and the broadcast secret key, which is confined from all nodes in the set n A by T A .
RREQ Broadcast
We consider a set-up where a source S requests to find a path to a destination D. where S seqNo is a sequence number and MAX_Hops is the maximum hop count. The node S now broadcasts an RREQ packet
where K SD is a secret shared between S and D. h 0 is a Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) designed for authentication by the destination node, M 0 is HMAC designed for authentication by two-hop nodes. All fields of the RREQ packet are encrypted by the one-hop secret key of S. A node A one hop from S decrypts the RREQ packet and broadcasts
A node B one-hop away from A and two-hops away from S decrypts the RREQ, verifies that After that the RREP packet has been unicast by node D.
It should be Notify that the RREP packet has two Hashed Message Authentication Codes -q 0 for verification by the source at the end of the RREP, and M DY for authentication by a node Y two hops away in the RREP path. [2] The RREP packets relayed by nodes Z and Y take the form
SRDP Implementation over Secure Cloud Communication Paradigm
This paper improves Effective Cost Management System (ECMS) by using Secure Route Discovery Protocol (SRDP) by implementing Secure Dynamic Source Routing (S-DSR). The ECMS includes two Algorithms:
1. Secure Optimum Route Cost Finder (S-ORCF) 2. Secure Optimum Route Maintenance (S-ORM).
We also improve Multiple Metrics for Path Cost (MMPC), which integrates the cost based on 
